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Argument 03

Incentive Failure

BIP-110 does not make demand disappear. It changes the route demand takes, and that route becomes less transparent, more centralized, and more favorable to insiders.

Core objection:

If public relay paths become hostile to a class of transactions while miners still have an economic reason to include them, users and pools will route around the public mempool. That is not a clean victory. It is an opacity upgrade.

Demand Does Not Vanish

Users who strongly value inclusion do not simply give up because one proposal bans an existing pattern. They adapt, try nearby constructions or pay for custom handling. That is normal economic behavior.

Private Order Flow Gets Stronger

Once a transaction class becomes controversial, well-connected actors can go straight to miners or pools and negotiate directly. Smaller participants cannot do this nearly as easily, which makes the market less open.

Public Fee Discovery Gets Worse

The public mempool at least offers a visible price surface. When controversial demand moves into private channels, outside observers see less of the true auction and more of the negotiated edges around it.

Centralization Pressure Increases

Larger operators are better positioned to manage custom routing, direct customer relationships and political heat. BIP-110 therefore risks strengthening exactly the kind of concentration its supporters often claim to oppose.