It does not fully remove arbitrary data
Demand adapts and payloads move. Miners are asked to enforce a new consensus boundary without the benefit of actually ending the pressure that motivated the proposal.
Miner objections are not secondary. BIP-110 asks block producers to absorb political pressure, revenue distortion, activation uncertainty and private-order-flow dynamics in exchange for a fix that still does not remove the underlying demand.
From a miner standpoint, BIP-110 adds coordination burden and political exposure while undermining transparent fee discovery. That is a poor trade even before considering split risk.
Demand adapts and payloads move. Miners are asked to enforce a new consensus boundary without the benefit of actually ending the pressure that motivated the proposal.
When public paths close, direct miner access matters more. That shifts power toward large pools and connected actors rather than toward open fee competition.
Pools must decide which software to run, how exchanges will respond and whether minority-chain scenarios will create avoidable losses.
Once this path is normalized, block producers will face repeated pressure to enforce the next list of unacceptable transactions.
Instead of one visible auction for blockspace, the network gets a mixture of public pricing and private negotiation that is harder to evaluate and easier to centralize.
Custom routing, political handling and direct commercial relationships favor larger players. That is the wrong direction for Bitcoin's mining landscape.
This page follows the miner-side critique highlighted by Jason Hughes in his July 15, 2026 X article, "BIP-110 - My Notes to Miners."